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Daily we hear in the media about protest movements in various places. Our 
times are days of political and social unrest. For a long time, we have imagined 
that the modern world is historically the most developed and well-ordered. 
We have looked back and down upon former ages as primitive. Faced with 
present tensions, it may be of value to revisit some of the ancient cultures. 
In recent years we have seen a major rethinking of law and order in ancient 
societies. It has become clear that the ancient world was not governed by a 
prescriptive understanding of law. Adriaan Lanni’s Law and Order in Ancient 
Athens is one more volume adding to this new perspective.
As Lanni describes, the book is about the puzzle and paradox that Ancient 
Athens had limited formal coercive apparatus, no professional police or 
public prosecutor, and legal processes depended almost entirely upon private 
initiative. Even when an opponent was convicted to pay compensation, for 
instance, there was no official agency ensuring that this actually happened. 
Ancient Athens did not have “a rule of law” in the sense of court sanctions 
being based upon predictable, consistent, and written statutes. Still, ancient 
Athens was a “remarkably peaceful and well-ordered society by both ancient 
and contemporary standards” (1). 
Lanni argues convincingly that neither informal controls—such as social 
sanctions (ridicule, shunning), internalized norms, self-help when a victim 
of crime, and private discipline of women, minors, and slaves, nor formal 
imposition of sanctions—such as those ruled by the courts, can adequately 
explain the order upheld, for the most part, in ancient Athens. The irony 
is that “the aspects of the Athenian legal system that seem to us the most 
removed from a ‘rule of law’ may actually have been the most effective in 
fostering order and compliance with norms” (200; cf. also 119).
According to the research presented by Lanni, the ancient Athens had 
inbuilt mechanisms to guarantee compliance with norms through a dynamic 
relation between informal and formal controls. Ancient Athens was a culture 
of honor and shame. What was considered acceptable and respectable there-
fore set the standard of conduct. In legal cases, disputants would regularly cite 
other laws than those directly applicable to the present case. In this way, the 
populace was constantly reminded of the norms and laws of society. Further, 
courts were neither bound by statutes or legal precedents, but would make a 
democratic verdict in the face of the present dispute and circumstances. Given 
the publicity of court cases, this would contribute to publicizing the present 
norms and values of the city, even when they might deviate from written 
laws. In court cases, character descriptions of oneself or one’s opponent were 
frequent and taken into consideration, even when these character descriptions 
were not directly relevant to the case in dispute. Knowing that one’s conduct, 
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whatever it may have been, could be publicized in court, even in unrelated 
disputes, would have a deterrent role compensating for the underenforcement 
through formal sanctions.
Our own assumptions and preconceptions can often be a challenge in the 
study of ancient cultures. Written sources that for an ancient mind would be 
meaningful and self-evident given their context, may easily be misinterpreted 
and misunderstood from our perspective. This is the challenge we often face 
in the study of ancient manuscripts. Lanni’s discussion often needs to rest on 
indirect evidence and indications. At certain points one could desire more 
explicit and broader support for the conclusions. Her work is therefore likely 
not the last word in the discussion. Still, she should be commended for being 
able to present a consistent picture of how ancient Athens could be so peace-
ful and well-ordered, given the relative absence of the formal enforcement 
that we, as moderns, tend to consider necessary for maintaining social order.
For biblical studies, I find Lanni’s book to be of special interest. In 
OT studies, the legislative understanding of Torah has recently come under 
scrutiny. It appears difficult to continue to uphold the traditional view that 
ancient Israel was controlled by a “rule of law” as we think of it in modern 
terms. In NT studies as well, a legalistic interpretation of the rabbis and Phari-
sees has been challenged more recently. The question, then, is how ancient 
Israel maintained peace and order if they did not perceive Torah as we do our 
modern constitutions and laws. Even if the judges should be instructed in 
Torah (Exod 18:19–23), the function of Torah in the ancient Israelite court 
appears to have worked differently than in modern jurisprudence. This is 
something about which several scholars have written extensively and needs 
not be repeated here. Lanni’s contribution to this debate is to show how, 
in ancient Athens, law functioned and order was upheld differently than in 
modern societies. Her study resonates in many ways with finds from other 
cultures of the ancient Near East (ANE).
We can mention three parallels to the biblical material. First, “Athenian 
statutes were notoriously vague. As a result, many statutes did not provide 
much guidance about how to conform one’s conduct to the law” (56). As 
biblical scholars, we can recognize parallels to this description in the nature 
of the Torah. Torah, as other ANE laws, is not as comprehensive as we find 
that our modern laws need to be. While Torah sanctions deviations from 
marriage norms, it never, for example, regulates what constitutes the institu-
tion of marriage as such. At least from our modern perspective, many of the 
moral and cultic instructions appear vague and underdefined. Second, “Plato, 
at least, was aware of the expressive power of law and attempted to harness 
this power in his model constitution, the Laws. He argues that it is better to 
use law to persuade citizens to obey, making direct sanctions unnecessary” 
(85). Also, in Torah we find an emphasis upon the public reading of Torah 
(Exod 24:7; Deut 31:9–11; Josh 8:30–35; Neh 8:1–18; 2 Kgs 23:1–3; Luke 
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4:14–34; Acts 13:15, 15:21, 17:2; 1 Tim 4:13) as well as the need to inter-
nalize its instructions (e.g., Deut 6:6–9, 11:18–21), all this in order to act 
upon the basis of conviction rather than coercion. Finally, Lanni argues that, 
even if the ancient Athenian “courts did not predictably and reliably enforce 
statutes,” still “these laws had a symbolic force that operated as a significant 
influence on everyday behavior” (118). Again, we find a parallel to ancient 
Israel, where the ideal was to have the law written on one’s heart rather than 
being enforced by social control.
In this way, I find Lanni’s book instructive for biblical studies on how 
Torah might have functioned in ancient Israel, as well as giving us a fascinat-
ing glimpse into ancient Athens. In addition, while our modern cultures are 
very different, they nevertheless draw from both ancient Israel and Athens. 
Therefore, it may be very instructive to reflect on how these societies sought 
to maintain peace and order differently than we do. 
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The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism was put together to promote 
discussion on the nature of humans and their mental states—specifically 
views under the umbrella of substance dualism in a broad sense as well as 
critiques of these views from a variety of perspectives. The open intent of 
its organizers is “to construct a level playing ground of debate for all of the 
various positions and their critics” (1). The work was edited by Jonathan J. 
Loose (senior lecturer in philosophy and psychology at Heythrop College, 
University of London), Angus J. L. Menuge (professor of philosophy at Con-
cordia University Wisconsin and president of the Evangelical Philosophical 
Society), and J. P. Moreland (professor of philosophy at Talbot School of 
Theology, Biola University). 
The volume contains thirty-two articles written by twenty-nine contrib-
utors. After two introductory articles, the remaining ones are organized into 
three parts: first, “Articulating Substance Dualism”; second, “Alternatives 
to Substance Dualism,” and, third, “Substance Dualism, Theology, and the 
Bible.” Each of these parts is further divided into subsections, each containing 
two or three articles that debate a given topic from different perspectives so 
as to allow readers to “decide for themselves where the better arguments lie” 
(1). In part one, the debates are on emergent dualism, Thomistic dualism, 
Cartesian dualism, the unity of consciousness, and near-death experiences. In 
part two, authors debate animalism, nonreductive physicalism, constitution-
